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Abstract 
Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a single-state semi-quantum key distribution 
protocol (Int. J. Quantum Inf, 18, 4, 2020) to help a quantum participant to share a 
secret key with a classical participant. However, this study shows that an 
eavesdropper can use a double C-NOT attack to obtain parts of the final shared key 
without being detected by the participants. To avoid this problem, a modification is 
proposed here. 
Keywords: Quantum key distribution; Semi-quantum; Double C-NOT attack 
1. Introduction 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [1] is designed to help the participants 
share a secret key without being eavesdropped. However, in most of the existing QKD 
protocols [2-4], all the participants need to have lots of quantum capabilities, such as 
quantum register, quantum joint measurement, and so on. To help the participants who 
just have restricted quantum capacities can be involved in the QKD, the 
semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol is proposed. 
In 2007, an SQKD protocol was proposed by Boyer et al. [5]. With their protocol, 
a classical participant with restricted quantum capacities can share a secret key with a 
quantum participant who has unrestricted quantum capacities. According to Boyer et 
al.’s definition, the classical participants are restricted to perform parts of the 
following quantum operations: (1) generate qubits in Z-basis { 0 , 1 } , (2) measure 
qubits with the Z-basis, (3) reorder the qubits via different quantum delay lines, and (4) 
send or reflect the qubits. Subsequently, these definitions have been widely used in 
the following proposed semi-quantum protocols [6-12]. 
Recently, Zhang et al. [13] proposed a single-state semi-quantum key distribution 
protocol. They claimed that the proposed SQKD protocol can ensure a quantum 
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participant and a classical participant share a secret key without being eavesdropped. 
However, this study shows that Zhang et al.’s SQKD protocol suffers from a double 
C-NOT attack which can reveal parts of the final shared key to an eavesdropper. To 
solve this problem, a modification is proposed. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews Zhang et 
al.’s SQKD protocol. Section 3 shows that an eavesdropper can obtain parts of the 
final shared key by a double C-NOT attack and then proposes an improvement to 
avoid it. At last, a conclusion is given in Section 4. 
2. A brief review of Zhang et al.’s SQKD 
In Zhang et al.’s protocol [13], four kinds of single photons { 0 , 1 ,    
   
1 1
0 1 , 0 1
2 2
    } are used. Assume that Bob is a classical 
participant who just has the above quantum capacities {(1), (2), (4)} and Alice is a 
quantum participant with unrestricted quantum capacities. Then Zhang et al.’s SQKD 
protocol can be described as follows: 
Step 1: Alice generates n  single photons in   and sends these single photons to 
Bob one by one. 
Step 2: Bob generates a random bit sequence  1 2= , , ,B B B BnK k k k . For the i th 
(1 i n  ) particle received, Bob chooses one of the two following cases 
according to Bik :  
Case (a). If =0Bik , Bob reflects this particle to Alice directly. 
Case (b). If =1Bik , Bob measures this particle with Z-basis and then sends a 
single photon in the state 0  back to Alice instead.  
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Step 3: For each particle sent back, Alice randomly uses Z-basis { 0 , 1 }  or 
X-basis { , }   to measure it. Then she generates a value sequence 
 1 2= , , ,A A A AnK k k k  according to the measurement results. That is, for the 
i th (1 i n  ) particle, Aik  is decided as follows. 
(1) If the measurement result is 1 , =0Aik . 
(2) If the measurement result is  , =1Aik . 
(3) Otherwise, = -1Aik . 
 Step 4: Alice announces all the positions where = -1Aik  and discards these values 
in AK  to obtain AK  . Then Bob discards the corresponding bits in BK  to 
derive BK  . 
Step 5: To check the eavesdropping, Bob randomly chooses half bits in BK   and 
announces their positions and values. Subsequently, Alice checks whether the 
announced positions and values are the same as AK   or not. If the error rate 
exceeds a predetermined value, this protocol will be aborted. Otherwise, Alice 
and Bob discard the announced bits in AK   and BK   to obtain the final 
shared key ABK , respectively.  
3. Double C-NOT attack and counterattack on Zhang et al.’s 
protocol  
Zhang et al. claimed that the above SQKD protocol can ensure the final shared key is 
secure. However, this section points out that Zhang et al.’s SQKD protocol suffers 
from a double C-NOT attack. That is, an eavesdropper Eve can use a double C-NOT 
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attack to obtain parts of the final shared key without being detected. Besides, to avoid 
this loophole, a simple modification is proposed here.  
3.1. The Double C-NOT Attack on Zhang et al.’s SQKD protocol 
The processes of the double C-NOT attack on Zhang et al.’s protocol can be simply 
described as follows. For each particle sent from Alice to Bob, Eve performs a 
C-NOT operation ( 00 00 01 01 10 11 11 10C NOT     ) on both the 
transmitted particle and a target particle generated by herself. Then, Eve sends the 
transmitted particle to Bob. After Bob sends a particle back in Step 2, Eve performs a 
C-NOT operation on this particle and the corresponding target particle again. 
Subsequently, Eve uses the target particle to judge whether the particle sent back from 
Bob is the original one or not. According to this, Eve can obtain parts of ABK . 
For example, as is shown in Table 1, assume that cq  is the particle sent from 
Alice to Bob. Eve generates a target particle tq  in the state 0  and performs the 1
st 
time C-NOT operation on  ,c tq q  to obtain two qubits  1 1,c tq q . Eve stores 1tq  
and sends 
1
cq  to Bob. Afterward, in Step 2, Bob performs the case (a) or (b) on 
1
cq  
according to BK . If Bob performs the case (a) on 
1
cq , the measurement result is 
named as 
2
cq  and then Bob sends a qubit 
3 = 0cq  back to Alice. Otherwise, Bob 
directly reflects the qubit 
1
cq  to Alice and here we also use 
3
cq  to represent this 
qubit for further discussion. For 
3
cq  sent back, Eve performs the 2
nd time C-NOT 
operation on  3 1,c tq q  to obtain  4 2,c tq q  and sends 4cq  to Alice. Subsequently, 
Eve measures 2tq  with Z-basis. If the measurement result is 1 , it means that the 
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corresponding bit in BK  must be ‘1’.  Moreover, according to Table 1, we can find 
that no matter which operation is chosen by Bob in Step 2, 
4
cq  always matches the 
case result. That is, if Bob chooses the case (a), 
4
cq  is in   which is the expected 
result of the case (a) in the original protocol. Similarly, if Bob chooses the case (b), 
4
cq  will be in 0  which is the same as expectation. Hence, this attack cannot be 
detected by the participants during the eavesdropping detection process. That means 
Eve can use this attack to obtain parts of ABK  without being detected. 
Table 1. States transformation during the double C-NOT attack 
Initial 1st C-NOT BK  Bob’s operation Particle sent back 2
nd C-NOT 
,c tq q  1 1,c tq q  
 2 1,c tq q  
3 1,c tq q  
4 1,c tq q  
0
c tq q

  
1 1
c tq q
  
0 Reflect 2 1
c tq q
  
3 1
c tq q
  4 10
c tq q
  
1 
measure 2 100
c tq q
  3 100
c tq q
 4 100
c tq q
 
measure 2 111
c tq q
  3 101
c tq q
 4 101
c tq q
 
 
3.2. A solution to avoid Double C-NOT attack on Zhang et al.’s SQKD protocol 
As mentioned above, because Eve can distinguish parts of the particles measured by 
Bob where the measurement result of 
1
cq  is 1 , she can obtain parts of ABK . Hence, 
if Bob and Alice discard all the bits in ABK  where the corresponding measurement 
result of 
1
cq  is 1 , then this problem can be solved. The improved protocol is then 
described as follows. 
Step 1’-3’ are the same as Step 1-3 in Section 2.  
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Step 4’: Alice announces all the positions where = -1Aik  and Bob announces all the 
positions where the measurement results are 1  in Step 2. Subsequently, 
Alice and Bob discard all the bits in the above positions in AK  and BK  to 
obtain AK   and BK  , respectively.  
Step 5’ is the same as Step 5 in Section 2. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper points out a double C-NOT attack on Zhang et al.’s SQKD protocol. With 
this attack, an eavesdropper can obtain parts of the final shared key without being 
detected. To solve this problem, a modification without needing the involved classical 
participant to have any extra quantum capacities is proposed.  
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